
The British commanders at this time did not grasp that German defensive tactics included placing the second line of machine gun nests on the reverse slopes of hills destroying them would need howitzers and shells with high explosives. With only 533 guns and a shortage of shells to cover 11,200 yd (6.4 mi 10.2 km) front with two German trench lines to bombard, the British would probably be attacking positions that had not been disrupted enough to cause a breakthrough and reliant on the success of the gas attack. Haig was hampered by the shortage of artillery ammunition, which meant the preliminary bombardment, essential for success in trench warfare, was insufficient. Haig and Foch, commander of the groupe des armées du nord ( Northern Army Group), wanted the reserves closer, to exploit a breakthrough on the first day French agreed to move them nearer to the front but still thought they should not be committed until the second day. French was doubtful that a breakthrough would be achieved. Archibald Murray, the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (DCIGS) advised French that as troops fresh from training, they were suited for the long marches of an exploitation rather than for trench warfare. Sir French decided to keep a reserve consisting of the Cavalry Corps, the Indian Cavalry Corps and XI Corps (Lieutenant-General Richard Haking), which consisted of the Guards Division and the New Army 21st Division and 24th Division, recently arrived in France and a corps staff (some of whom had never worked together or served on a staff before). The battle was the third time that specialist Royal Engineer tunnelling companies were used to dig under no-man's-land, to plant mines under the parapets of the German front line trenches, ready to be detonated at zero hour. At a conference on 6 September, Haig announced to his subordinates that extensive use of chlorine gas might facilitate an advance on a line towards Douai and Valenciennes, despite the terrain, as long as the French and British were able to keep the attack secret. On 3 May, the British had decided to use poison gas in military operations in France. The debate continued into August, with Joffre siding with Foch and the British commanders being over-ruled by Herbert Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, on 21 August. At the Frévent Conference on 27 July, Field Marshal French failed to persuade Ferdinand Foch that an attack further north offered greater prospects for success. Field Marshal Sir John French and Douglas Haig (GOC First Army), regarded the ground south of La Bassée Canal, which was overlooked by German-held slag heaps and colliery towers, as unsuitable for an attack, particularly given the discovery in July that the Germans were building a second defensive position behind the front position. The battle was the British part of the Third Battle of Artois, an Anglo-French offensive (known to the Germans as the Herbstschlacht (Autumn Battle). German tactical defensive proficiency was still dramatically superior to the British offensive planning and doctrine, resulting in a British defeat.īackground Strategic developments The British gas attack failed to neutralize the defenders and the artillery bombardment was too short to destroy the barbed wire or machine gun nests. Despite improved methods, more ammunition and better equipment, the Franco-British attacks were largely contained by the Germans, except for local losses of ground. The French and British tried to break through the German defences in Artois and Champagne and restore a war of movement. It was the biggest British attack of 1915, the first time that the British used poison gas and the first mass engagement of New Army units. The Battle of Loos took place from 25 September to 8 October 1915 in France on the Western Front, during the First World War.
